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WHY THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT CANNOT
PROTECT SACRED SITES
Timothy Wiseman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is a pluralistic society, supporting an
enormous array of different religions and often multiple independent
interpretations of those religions. The United States has fallen short
of its aspirations to show full tolerance for minority religions, 1 even
though it enshrines protections for the vital rights of freedom of
religion in its Constitution. 2 However, the way these rights of
freedom of religion have been interpreted and protected by the
judiciary, particularly under the Free Exercise Clause, has varied
throughout the years.
Seminal cases including Sherbert 3 and Yoder 4 helped establish
what came to be known as the substantial burden test. The
substantial burden test determines when a government action was at
risk of violating the protections of the First Amendment religious
rights. Although this test was used numerous times, its applicability
was severely narrowed in Smith. 5 This narrowing sparked outrage
from a variety of religious groups, political groups, and the general
public. They felt that, as narrowed, it left far too little protection for
their religious freedoms. This is especially significant since some
government actions may infringe upon a religious freedom in ways
that may not be obvious to the institutions that take the action or
promulgate the law. Thus, Congress responded to the outcry and
∗

Timothy A. Wiseman is a practicing attorney and programmer in Las Vegas,
Nevada. He would like to thank the American Indian Law Journal for their
editorial assistance as well as Professor Jay Bybee for providing feedback on an
early draft.
1
The U.S. for a time banned the use of peyote in spite of significance to certain
Native American Religions. See, Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
874 (1990); see also infra Part II. Although later rectified by the courts, inmates
in Ohio have been denied access to items essential for their worship. See, e.g.,
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. art. I
3
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
4
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
5
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
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passed the Religious Freedom Restoration (RFRA) act with the
specific intention of restoring the jurisprudence to the state it was in
before Smith. 6
While it was valuable in protecting the rights of religious
minorities, the substantial burden test was not enough to protect
Native American religions and their sacred places, either before or
after the RFRA was passed. Many of these sacred places are located
on land owned by the federal government and actions by federal
agencies may disturb or even desecrate these important sites. 7 Even
before the Smith decision, the courts frequently failed to protect
some of these sacred locations from federal agencies, or even to
subject these actions to the full scrutiny of a compelling interest
test. 8 In fact, the Supreme Court has been openly critical of
restrictions placed on what the government can do with federal land
based on religious needs. 9 Some have claimed that the RFRA
legislatively expanded the protections beyond the precise test as
established by Sherbert and Yoder, and that this should now provide
better protection for the sacred places in America. 10 But the Ninth
Circuit has ruled that the RFRA uses the phrase “substantial burden”
in a precise way that limits the applicability of the statue. 11 As the
Ninth Circuit has interpreted the phrase in Navajo Nation, 12 the
protections of the RFRA can only be invoked when a government
action either denies a benefit or delivers a punishment for following
religious precepts. 13
This paper will explain that the Ninth Circuit established the
correct definition for “substantial burden” as that phrase is used in
the RFRA, and so the political branches must act to protect locations
6

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012).
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Toward a Balanced Approach for the Protection of
Native American Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 270 (2012); Marcia
Yablon, Property Rights and Sacred Sites, 113 YALE L. J. 1623, 1627 (2004).
8
See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S.
439 (1988).
9
Id. at 453 (explaining that whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the
area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its rights to use what
is, after all, its land).
10
Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1175, 1213 (1996).
11
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
12
The Navajo Nation case is also referred to as the “San Francisco Peaks
litigation” by some commentators. Skibine, supra note 7 at 275 n.40.
13
Id.
7
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sacred to Native American religions. Despite the eloquent dissent
and subsequent academic literature criticizing Navajo Nation, it was
correctly decided. This only shows that other methods must be used
to ensure that federal agencies show great deference to the needs of
Native Americans when making decisions about federal land. Part
II of this paper will look at the history that led to the passage of the
RFRA, including the cases which established the substantial burden
test, the Smith case which vastly narrowed the use of that standard,
and the passage of the RFRA itself which largely nullified Smith.
Part III will explore some significant applications of the substantial
burden test to the protection of the Native American religion in
general and, in particular, their sacred religious sites. It will then
look at the Navajo Nations case, which dealt with using recycled
water on sacred land. The implications of that decision, which did
not protect the Native American interests will be explored. This
section will also look at how that case has impacted other cases and
how it has been viewed in academic literature. Part IV will explore
both the affirmative case for the interpretation of the phrase
“substantial burden” used by the Ninth Circuit. Part IV will also
explore and respond to the criticisms which have been raised in the
dissent and in other papers. The paper will conclude that Native
American sacred places need further protection, but that this
protection must come through additional actions from the political
branches rather than changes in judicial interpretation.
II. SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS, SMITH, AND THE RFRA
A. Establishing the Substantial Burden Test in Sherbert and Yoder
The Constitution protects the people’s right to religious freedom
in the First Amendment, which says "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof…". 14 Based on this amendment, the Supreme Court
established what came to be called the "substantial burden test." 15
14

U.S. CONST. amend. art. I.
Eloise H. Bouzari, The Substantial Burden Test's Impact on the Free Exercise
of Minority Religions, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 123, 124 (1996). This test is
also occasionally referred to as the "compelling interest test". See id. at n.9.
15
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This test arose from the Supreme Court cases of Sherbert v. Verner
and Wisconsin v. Yoder when read together. 16
In Sherbert, an employer terminated a member of the Seventh
Day Adventist Church after she refused to work her Church's
Sabbath of Saturday. 17 She filed for unemployment compensation,
but was denied payment because she refused to accept any
employment which would require her to break her Sabbath. 18 She
appealed this decision, and eventually came before the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court stated that to be constitutionally
acceptable, the law must either place no burden upon the right of
free exercise of religion or that the burden must be justified by a
compelling and legitimate interest. 19 The Court then found that this
law placed a burden on the plaintiff because following her religion
would force her give up government benefits. 20 It further found that
there was no sufficiently compelling interest to justify this burden,
noting that it required more than a mere rational basis to justify such
an infringement on free exercise. 21
Yoder was decided after Sherbert, and dealt with members of the
Old Order Amish and Conservative Amish Mennonite Churches
who refused to send their children to required education beyond the
eighth grade for religious reasons. 22 The Court found that when a
state action "interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious
belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free
exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the Free Exercise Clause." 23 Although the Court
recognized the state's legitimate interest in seeing that the children
were educated, it emphasized that "only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
16

Id. See also Jessica M. Wiles, Note, Have American Indians Been Written Out
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 71 MONT. L. REV. 471, 474-475
(2010). The exact phrase “substantial burden” does not appear in either Sherbert
or Yoder. Skibine, supra note 7 at 278.
17
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
18
Id. at 400-01.
19
Id. at 403-04.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 406-07.
22
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-208 (1972).
23
Id. at 214.
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claims to the free exercise of religion." 24 The Court found that the
state's interest in this case could not balance out the rights of free
expression, combined with the interests of parenthood that they had
asserted, especially since the court found that the Amish did provide
continued education even if it was not of the form the state
preferred. 25
Together, these cases established the substantial burden test. 26
That test requires that the court determine if a government action
imposed a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. If it
did, then the court would have to consider a second step and
determine if the burden was outweighed by a compelling, legitimate
interest. 27 This test was applied a number of times, with some minor
variations and interpretations until 1990 when the Supreme Court
considered Employment Division v. Smith. 28
B. Changing the Substantial Burden Test with Smith
In Smith, the Court significantly reduced the applicability of the
substantial burden test, and this decision created intense academic
discussion of the matter. 29 Here, Alfred Smith and Galen Black were
terminated from their positions with a private company after it was
learned that they had used peyote, a controlled substance under the
law, in one of their religious activities. 30 The fact that the peyote
was used as part of an organized religious ritual and that it was
forbidden by their religious organizations for use outside of such

24

Id. at 215.
Id. at 233-35.
26
Wiles, supra note 16 at 475. See also Bouzari, supra note 15 at 124.
27
Some academic commentators such as Jessica Wiles have asserted that there
was also a requirement that it be done with the least restrictive means. Wiles,
supra note 15 at 475. However, I was unable to find that language in either
Sherbert or Yoder. Further, the Ninth Circuit in interpreting the RFRA
specifically stated that Congress added that language to the RFRA as an addition
to the original test in the pre-Smith jurisprudence. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest
Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008).
28
Bouzari, supra note 15 at 124. See e.g. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S.
707 (1981).
29
Bouzari, supra note 15 at 124.
30
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
25
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rituals did not protect them from being terminated. 31 They then
requested unemployment compensation from the state, and they
were denied since they had been terminated for misconduct which
violated state law. 32 They sought judicial intervention. The Oregon
Supreme Court, following the reasoning in Sherbert found that
denying them unemployment benefits under these circumstances
would be a violation of their free expression rights. The U.S.
Supreme Court then considered the case, but remanded it to the
Oregon Supreme Court which again found in favor of Mr. Smith and
Mr. Black, and the Supreme Court once again granted certiorari. 33
The Supreme Court declared that the substantial burden test, as
announced in Sherbert, was only applicable in the field of
unemployment compensation. 34 In particular, they said that the
Sherbert test was not relevant to a "generally applicable criminal
law." 35 Although this case did deal with an unemployment claim,
the applicability of the criminal law banning the use of peyote was
significant since they were denied unemployment benefits because
they were terminated for violating a criminal law. The Court also
distinguished this situation from Yoder. The Court noted that here
the terminated employees claimed only rights under the Free
Exercise Clause had been violated while in Yoder, and many of the
other cases where the substantial burden test was employed, another
right was asserted along with the Free Exercise Clause. 36 Those
other cases involved hybrid rights where Free Exercise was
buttressed by some other significant right. In Yoder in particular, the
Amish asserted their rights to direct the education of their children
along with their religious rights. 37 The court emphasized that the
centrality or significance of the religious belief could not play a role
in determining what test would be used to determine if the law was
constitutional. 38 It would be neither appropriate nor possible for a
31
Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in
American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387, 394 (2012).
32
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 875 (1990).
33
Id. at 875-76.
34
Id. at 883.
35
Id. at 884.
36
Id. at 881-82.
37
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-35 (1972). supra note Section II.A.
38
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990).
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court to decide what was central to a religion and what was more
peripheral.
With this backdrop, the court found that the requirement to show
a compelling interest was rarely applicable in the context of
religious freedom. It was effectively limited to cases that could
allege a violation of a hybrid right. 39 The majority opinion went so
far as to call a broad application of this test to religious matters to
be "courting anarchy." 40 The majority provided a parade of horribles
of matters, in other words, a list of matters that could be challenged
on a religious basis that the majority felt it would be undesirable to
leave exposed to such challenges. 41 The majority expressed their
concerns that health and safety regulations, animal cruelty laws, and
even child labor laws could be challenged in this way. 42 It concluded
by finding that the prohibition of peyote was constitutional;
therefore, the denial of the unemployment benefits was proper. 43 It
stated that those burdened were not left without recourse though,
since those who felt their religious freedom was being infringed
could seek aid from the legislative and executive branches through
the political process. 44 The court directly recognized that this may
be difficult for minority religions which may have trouble gaining
attention from the more political branches of government. 45 Because

39

Id. at 881. See also Wiles, supra note 16 at 477 (discussing the hybrid claims).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89.
41
The court does not make clear in its parade of horribles why subjecting these
matters to a substantial burden scrutiny is actually horrible. Presumably those of
true significance could pass the examination, and the rest perhaps should either
not be regulated by law at all or could accommodate religious exemptions. The
first example, for instance, is compulsory military service, but America does
allow for conscientious objector status so long as the objector meets certain
qualifications. As discussed in the next section, Congress appeared to think that
the test was workable. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89.
42
Id.; Some academics agreed with the concerns about some of the items in the
parade of horribles. For instance, some religions permit punishments that would
be considered domestic violence under secular law, and some academics are
concerned that without limitations on religious protections like those established
in Smith their religion could give the abusers effective protections from those
laws. Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women’s Equality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1832, 1833 (2011).
43
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89.
44
Id.
45
Id.
40
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of this, Native Americans in practice have limited protections for
their religious rights in some cases.
C. Nullifying Smith with RFRA
The decision in Smith was subject to vigorous academic
discussion and even in the popular press, much of it critical of the
ruling and the reasoning used by the majority. 46 Many groups
reacted with anger and shock, as they saw this as a direct threat to
the protections of the religious freedom. 47 One professor went as far
as saying that “the Court had held that every American has a right
to believe in a religion, but no right to practice it.” 48 Lower courts
naturally took their guidance from this ruling, with some academics
watching these courts saying that they took the ruling to mean that
free expression arguments could have no sway, and that no facially
neutral law could be found infirm based solely on a free expression
challenge. 49 Not all academics were inclined to see Smith as either
incorrect or entirely undesirable as a precedent. 50 It could ensure that
some could not use religion to escape responsibility for their
improper actions. 51 However, the weight of opinion was firmly
aligned against the precedent in Smith, and a broad consortium of
individuals and groups, from a variety of political leanings and a
variety of religious beliefs, called for Congressional intervention in
the matter. 52 Congress heard them, and answered.
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA). 53 The act had overwhelmingly broad support. It was
supported by both Republicans and Democrats, with members of
both parties sponsoring the bill. 54 It was swiftly signed into law by
46

Bouzari, supra note 15 at 124-25.
See Wiles, supra note 16 at 478.
48
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L.
REV. 221, 221 (1993).
49
Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 214-15 (1994).
50
See generally Griffin, supra note 35.
51
Arguing that it provided protection for some groups, particularly women, from
those who may cloak their illicit activities with religion. Id.
52
Laycock & Thomas, supra note 49 at 210-11.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 214-15.
47
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President Clinton. 55 The bill had a stated purpose of restoring the
compelling interest test and directly cited both Sherbert and Yoder. 56
The Committee on the Judiciary, in its report for the House of
Representatives, said it expected “that the courts will look to the free
exercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance”. 57
The bill, in its findings, specifically named Smith as an impetus for
the passage of the bill. 58 The Senate, in its consideration, specifically
sought to ensure protection for minority religions, who may not
always be able to readily gain the attention of the political branches
of the government. 59
The RFRA created a cause of action to challenge a government
action that substantially burdened exercise of religion under the test
established in Sherbert and Yoder. 60 It permitted that substantial
burden to stand only if the government could then show it was
necessary for a compelling government interest and that it was the
least restrictive means of achieving that goal. 61 As scholars
promptly noted, the effectiveness of the RFRA depended on the
interpretation of the terms "exercise of religion," "substantially
burden," and "compelling interest." 62 The application of the RFRA
was swiftly challenged in court as it applies to states, and was found
unconstitutional in that context based on separation of powers. 63
This means that the states are not bound by the already limited
protections for freedom of religion provided by the RFRA.
However, it remains in effect as applied to the federal government,
and it provides additional protection beyond what is available under
the ruling in Smith. 64
55

Id. at 210.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012).
57
H.R. Rep. No. 103-88 at 6-7 (1993). Some scholars have argued that the bill
went beyond merely restoring the pre-Smith law. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental
Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1175, 1213 (1996); Skibine,
supra note 7 at 282.
58
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2012).
59
Sen. Rpt. No. 102-111 at 8 (July 27, 1993). See also Wiles, supra note 16 at
480.
60
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
61
Id.
62
Laycock & Thomas, supra note 49 at 210-11.
63
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
64
Gonzalez v. O Central Espirita Beneficenta Unaiao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
424 (2006). See also Carpenter, supra note 31 at 446.
56
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III. NATIVE AMERICANS, NAVAJO NATION, AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. Protecting Native Religions before Navajo Nation
The ability to practice their religion freely is vital to every group
of people with an independent identity. For Native Americans in
particular, tribal leaders have asserted that the ability to practice
their traditional religions is essential to their self-determination. 65
Navajo Nation President, Joe Shirley, has even said that restrictions
on their ability to practice their religion free from outside
contamination are akin to genocide as well as religious
persecution. 66 Because of the significance of their religion, there
have been a number of cases of Native Americans and Native
American groups seeking protection for their religious activities and
for places of religious significance to them.
One prominent example in the appellate courts is Sequoyah v.
TVA, which was decided in 1980. 67 Sequoyah was brought by
practitioners of the traditional Cherokee religion to prevent the
Tennessee Valley Authority from building a dam. 68 This dam would
have flooded regions that the Cherokee considered sacred as well as
areas once used as Cherokee cemeteries. Since it was decided in
1980, this case came after the substantial burden test is established
in Sherbert and Yoder but before the effects of Smith and the RFRA.
The court thus applied the substantial burden test and found that
there was no substantial burden that needed to be balanced. 69
Although they acknowledged that graves may be disturbed or that
significant places may be flooded, the court found that represented
personal preference rather than strongly held convictions. 70 In
comparing it with previous cases, the court found that there was
65

Carpenter, supra note 31 at 397.
Cyndy Cole, Snowmaking Opponents Now Targeting City Council, ARIZ
DAILY SUN, (Jan 13, 2006), available at http://azdailysun.com/snowmakingopponents-now-targeting-city-council/article_3cff71dc-acbf-59f9-846163548e54cfb5.html.
67
Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
68
Id. at 1160-61.
69
Id. at 1163-65.
70
Id.
66
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nothing which was inseparable from their way of life, or that was
central to their religion that would be destroyed by the flooding. 71
The court also noted, while saying that it was not dispositive by
itself, that the Cherokee has no legally recognized property interest
in the land in question. The court thus declined to protect this
significant place.
Another prominent example arose in Wilson v. Block in 1983. 72
In Wilson, groups representing both the Hopi and Navajo tribes sued
to prevent the further development of an area of the Coconino
National Forest, including the San Francisco Peaks. 73 The San
Francisco Peaks were of great religious significance to both the
Hopis and the Navajo. 74 The Navajo believed that the Peaks were
the home to certain spiritual beings and were significant for healing.
The Hopi also believed that a group of spiritual beings, called
Kachinas, occasionally dwelt on those peaks. 75 The Hopis asserted
in this case that use of this area for commercial purposes would be
an insult to the Creator and the Kachinas. Nevertheless, a portion of
the peaks had been used for recreational skiing since 1937. This suit
was launched because the forest service authorized the company
managing the ski facilities to clear additional land and upgrade the
facilities. The Native Americans asserted a claim under the Free
Exercise Clause. 76 The court highlighted the need for the plaintiff to
bear the initial burden of proof in a free exercise challenge to show
that the there was a burden upon religion. 77 Citing to Sherbert, the
court noted that this burden may be indirect. 78 But, while the burden
may be indirect, it must still come in the form of penalizing faith in
71

Id.
Wilson v. Block, 708 F. 2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
73
Id. at 738-39.
74
Id.
75
Id. Marcia Glowacka, et al., Navutakya’ovi, San Francisco Peaks, 50
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 547, 553-54 (2009) (using the transliteration
“Katsinam”).
76
They also asserted claims under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act,
the Endangered Species Act, and several other statutes. These other claims are
not relevant to this paper. The trial court found for the defendants on all but one
claim under the National Historic Preservation Act. The defendants brought
themselves into compliance with that act. Wilson v. Block, 708 F. 2d 735, 739
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
77
Wilson, 708 F. 2d at 740-42.
78
Id.
72
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some way. Government actions that merely offend believers or even
cast doubt upon the veracity of the belief, without in some way
penalizing that faith, will not place a burden upon the faith as that
term is used in Sherbert. 79 Thus, the court held that the tribes would
need to show that, at a minimum, the government’s plan would have
impaired some religious function that could not be performed
elsewhere for the land use to place a substantial burden on their
religion. 80
The tribes argued that they could meet that standard. The court
agreed that their affidavits showed that the use of the Peaks were
vital to their religions, both for ceremonies and for the gathering of
items which were significant to their ceremonies. 81 However, the
Forest Service had allowed the tribes free access to the Peaks for
religious purposes and planned to continue doing so. They could not
demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction any activity that they would
be unable to continue to perform after the expansion and
modernization. 82 The court, much like the court in Sequoyah, thus
declined to protect the Native American Religions under the Free
Exercise Clause. Much like Sequoyah, this case was decided before
Smith and overtly and conscientiously applied the standard set forth
in Sherbert.
B. The Navajo Nation Decision
Navajo Nation proved to be both a significant and highly
controversial decision from the Ninth Circuit, dealing with the
RFRA and the rights of Native Americans in particular. Much like
Wilson, the significant Navajo Nation decision revolves around the
San Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National Forest. 83 In 2002, the
operators of the ski facilities on the Peaks asked for permission to
use recycled wastewater to create artificial snow. 84 This would

79

Id.
Id. at 744-45.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 745.
83
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2008)
(noting that the ski facilities had been previously challenged in Wilson).
84
Id. at 1065.
80
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allow them to expand the season during which skiers could visit and
make use of the facility and improve the quality of the snow.
However, recycled wastewater can contain human waste even after
it has been processed. 85 In 2005, after investigations and
consultations with Native American groups, the Forest Service
approved the request by the operators to use recycled waste water. 86
Native American groups found this to be an affront to their
spirituality and began taking steps to prevent the use of the
wastewater. They began with an appeal to an administrative board,
and then sued in the district court. 87 Both the administrative appeal
board and the district court found that the use of the wastewater was
permissible. So, the Native American groups appealed to the Ninth
Circuit. A three judge panel initially found that this plan violated the
RFRA, but the Ninth Circuit then took the case en banc. 88
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered the case in light
of the RFRA. 89 The court stated that, similar to the Sherbert test
examined in Wilson,90 the initial burden of proof was on the Native
Americans to establish that this government action placed a
substantial burden on their exercise of religion. 91 Only if they
crossed this hurdle would the burden shift to the government to
show that its action supported a compelling government interest and
that it did so in the least restrictive way. Both sides agreed that the
Native Americans held sincere religious beliefs and were engaged
in the exercise of religion on the Peaks. 92 The Court focused on the
meaning of the phrase "substantial burden" in the context of the
RFRA.
The Religious Freedom Restoration act was explicitly intended
to restore the test established in Sherbert and Yoder, so the court

85

Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1066-67.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1067
89
Other matters were also before the court including the National Environmental
Policy Act and the national Historic Preservation Act. The Ninth Circuit found
in favor of the Forest Service on those issues as well, but those details are not
relevant here. Id. at 1063.
90
See supra Section III.A.
91
Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1068.
92
Id.
86
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examined the meaning of the phrase in those cases. 93 The Ninth
Circuit held that a "substantial burden" exists "only when
individuals are forced to choose between following the tenets of
their religion and receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert) or
coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil
or criminal sanctions (Yoder)." 94 They then went even further to say
that even if a government action could "virtually destroy" the ability
of a group to practice their religion it could not constitute a
"substantial burden" under the RFRA unless it did so through a
conditional benefit or coercion that compelled them to act contrary
to their faith. 95 As a matter of policy, the Court was concerned that
a broader reading of the meaning of those words could cause almost
any governmental action to be "subject to the personalized oversight
of millions of citizens" with a vast diversity of religious beliefs and
sensibilities. 96
The court found that there was no substantial burden, within the
meaning of the RFRA, placed upon the Native American's
religion. 97 While acknowledging that there may be a serious
diminishment of the spiritual fulfillment of Native Americans who
practice their religion on this peak and that it was offensive to their
religious sensibilities, the use of the wastewater neither denied them
a benefit nor attempted to coerce action from them. 98 It thus, under
this definition, did not place a cognizable substantial burden upon
them and there was no need to evaluate if there was a compelling
government interest or whether the least restrictive means to achieve
it were being used. Attempts by the Native American groups to
appeal to the Supreme Court were rejected. 99
C. Criticisms of the Navajo Nation Decision
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denied).
94

2016]

RFRA Cannot Protect

154

Since the release of the Navajo Nation opinion, there has been
extensive scholarship on its meaning and its impact. Much of that
scholarship agreed with the dissent and criticizing the majority
decision. 100 Ms. Wiles, for instance, has argued that the Ninth
Circuit has unduly narrowed the interpretation of the phrase
"substantial burden," and has turned the RFRA from a restriction on
effect to one that merely restricts the form of government action.101
She argues that giving the phrase its plain meaning would not create
the individual veto that the Ninth Circuit was concerned about but
would rather allow a more flexible protection for religious beliefs. 102
She highlights studies which have shown that government actions
satisfy the compelling interest test 72% of the time when it is fully
applied in the context of religious activity. 103 She also highlights
actions which she believe Congress specifically intended to prohibit
with the RFRA that she believes would not satisfy the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation. 104 Specifically, she believes that autopsies
would not qualify as a substantial burden as the Ninth Circuit has
phrased the test despite being banned by certain faiths. 105
Professor Carpenter also expressed concerns with the results of
the case. 106 She asserts that the RFRA as interpreted by the Ninth
Circuit will provide no protection for Native American sacred sites
or their religious freedom at those sites. 107 In fact, she believes that
under that interpretation, the courts will be unable to provide their
vital role of protecting minority rights from the political process
which is driven by the majority. 108 She asserts that this ruling will
leave the protection of tribal religions and their sacred sites at the
mercy of agency discretion. 109
100

See, e.g., Bouzari, supra note 15; Wiles, supra note 16.
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Ms. Erickson looks at Navajo Nation though a biopolitical lens
provided by Foucault. 110 Biopolitics is the ability of a government
to control its citizens as populations, and "the power to make live
and let die." 111 She highlights the strong link to the land itself in
Native American religions to show that there is no way to impact
the land they identify as sacred without affecting the populations and
their religion. 112 In Native American religions, unlike most sects of
Judeo-Christian tradition, particular places may be of great
significance to a religious experience and to religious belief. 113
Maintaining their religion, continuing religious ceremonies, and
perpetuating their religious history are vital for their survival as
tribes. They also all require ties to particular places and respect both
for land in general and for particular pieces of land which hold
religious significance for them. In this light, actions such as using
reclaimed wastewater on sacred land could be viewed as an
existential threat to the affected Native American tribes by
damaging their ability to practice their religions and traditions in a
way that the Native Americans will view as valid and pure. 114 She
argues that under the standard established by the Ninth Circuit it
would be unlikely that any Native American religious concerns
about how land sacred to them, but owned by the federal
government, would receive any protection. 115 Because of the
seriousness of the damage to the Native Americans both in this case
itself and in cases that come after it, Ms. Erickson urges a
reconsideration of the standard for "substantial burden" that the
Ninth Circuit has adopted.
D. The Aftermath of the Navajo Nation Decision
110

Ms. Erickson was, at the time of her paper, a student commentator with
Seattle University School of Law. She holds a B.A. in Philosophy and Religious
Studies. Jessica M. Erickson, Making Live and Letting Die: The Biopolitical
Effect of Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 33 Seattle Univ. L. Rev. 463
(2010).
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As discussed more in Section IV.B., she may well be right. This standard
would be hard to meet when it came to any proposed land use. Erickson, supra
note 110 at 497.
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The concerns that some critics have raised that the effects of the
Ninth Circuit's ruling might have on other cases affecting Native
American religions are not academic. The case has been cited
numerous times. The effects of the case were felt almost
immediately since the pending Snoqualmie Indian Tribe case had
been held in abeyance while waiting for the en banc rehearing of
Navajo Nation. 116 In that case, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) had authorized the continuation of a
hydroelectric project that affected the Snoqualmie River and the
Snoqualmie Falls into which the river flowed. The hydroelectric
project affected the tribe's access to the falls, which they used for
religious experiences. 117 It eliminated a mist that frequently formed
at the base of falls which was significant for their religious
practices. 118 This project altered the land itself, which the tribe
considered to be sacred. The Ninth Circuit applied the standard it
announced in Navajo Nation to determine that there was no
substantial burden placed upon the tribal religion. 119 Although this
project impacted the tribes, it did not place them in a situation where
exercise of their religion would either deprive them of government
benefits or subject them to sanctions. The Ninth Circuit thus again
declined to protect sites sacred to a Native American Tribe. 120 This
immediate aftermath of the Navajo Nation case showed the
importance of that decision, and how the courts cannot, under the
current laws, provide proper protection for sacred religious spaces.
IV. THE CASE FOR A NARROW READING OF “SUBSTANTIAL
BURDEN”
A. The Affirmative Case for a Narrow Reading of Substantial
Burden
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The majority's decision in Navajo Nation and in particular its
narrow interpretation of "substantial burden" was subjected to a
vigorous and eloquent dissent as well as well reasoned academic
criticism. Nontheless, the majority’s decision used the correct
interpretation of those words under both standards of statutory
interpretation and of policy. As the majority points out, a narrow
reading focusing on either a denial of benefits or punishment for
following a religious dictate is the natural interpretation of the
statute. 121 The RFRA used the term "substantial burden" without
providing a definition. When a statute uses a term of art which is
already well in use within the field the statute is referring to, it is
both natural and supported by precedent to assume, absent contrary
evidence, to give that term the meaning it has held as a term of art
rather than referring to a more conventional dictionary definition.122
Moreover, in this particular case, the statute expressly refers to two
cases that helped originally define that term of art. This shows that
it is correct to give this term of art its meaning in case law and to
give particular attention to those two cases when evaluating the
term.
In those cases, as the majority correctly points out, a substantial
burden was found when a government benefit was conditioned on
violating a religious precept or when sanctions were threatened
unless a religious precept was violated. 123 Cases that came after
Sherbert and Yoder in the Supreme Court, but before the RFRA, do
not provide evidence that the Supreme Court intended for a broader
meaning. The majority opinion expressly declares that there are no
cases in which the Supreme Court has found a substantial burden on
free exercise when it did not fall into one of those two categories. 124
In fact, other pre-Smith decisions would seem to emphasize the
narrowness of the use of this term. Lyng, which the majority opinion
discusses at length, is worthy of particular attention. 125
121

Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1068-71 (9th Cir.
2008), cert denied 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
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Id. at 1072.; Ms. Erickson asserts that Lyng limited the applicability of the
RFRA. This may be correct in a sense, but the Supreme Court decided Lyng in
1988, which puts it before the RFRA was passed in 1993 and even before Smith
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In Lyng, Native American groups challenged a Forest Service
decision to build a road through the Chimney Rock area of the Six
Rivers National Forest as well as harvest of timber from that area. 126
This road would help link two California towns. 127 It would also
disrupt the environmental conditions that are necessary for the
practice of certain rituals and religious practices of the Native
Americans. 128 The Supreme Court noted specifically that the Native
Americans were not being coerced into acting against their beliefs
nor would they be denied a benefit for acting according to their
beliefs. 129 Although the court never directly uses a phrase like
"substantial burden test," it does cite to Sherbert and Yoder and it
declines to find a heavy enough burden upon free exercise to force
the government to show a compelling interest in the road. 130 This
pre-Smith case decided by the Supreme Court supports, at least
indirectly, the interpretation given by the Ninth Circuit to the phrase
"substantial burden." 131
The Ninth Circuit is also correct as a matter of policy. It asserted
that a broader reading would permit every person to "hold and
individual veto to prohibit the government action solely because it
offends his religious beliefs, sensibilities, or tastes, or fails to satisfy
his religious desires." 132 As some critics have pointed out, the
majority may go too far in its language. A broad reading of
substantial burden would not grant the ability to outright forbid such
government actions, but it could make it much easier to force the

which was decided in 1990. This makes it a pre-Smith case which interpreted the
pre-Smith standard rather than an explicit limit or interpretation of the RFRA.
Erickson, supra note 110 at 477.
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the majority disagreed with the plaintiffs on the applicability of Lyng. Even
granting the plaintiff's assertions that Lyng should not be controlling, it is
certainly consistent with the decision reached by the majority. Navajo Nation v.
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government to demonstrate a compelling interest before taking
action. There are numerous religions, often with numerous sects and
subdivisions which have different beliefs; it could be quite easy to
offend the religious sensibilities of some sect with a government
action. Outside of coercion of some form, the legislature is better
equipped to evaluate the affects governmental actions on various
religions in this diverse society and to balance their needs than the
courts could be. 133
B. Responding to the Critics
Those who disagree with the majority have an array of
meritorious arguments for a broader reading. Perhaps the most
compelling is highlighting the great weight of spiritual disquiet this
particular decision and those that follow its example bring. Members
of the Navajo Nation have publicly compared the use of the
reclaimed wastewater, which may have some remnants of human
waste, on land they hold sacred to genocide. 134 Ms. Erickson came
close to that by saying it was a challenge to their ability to survive
as a unified tribe over time. 135 The dissent in Navajo Nation
eloquently lays out some details of the various religions of the
several Native American groups involved in the suit and shows the
significance of the Snowbowl area to them. 136 While the Native
Americans considered many areas sacred, the San Francisco Peaks
are more sacred than most others, and one of the Native American
leaders compared it to the Tabernacle. 137 The dissent highlighted
the statements of Navajo medicine men that the use of reclaimed
water, which may have come from mortuaries and hospitals, would
destroy his ability to practice as a medicine man and prevent him
from performing the Belssingway ceremony. 138 Similarly, the
Hualapi could be prevented from using the waters from the peaks in
133
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healing ceremonies in ways they would recognize as effective after
it was contaminated with wastewater. 139 Anthropologists
researching the matter have stated that use of the reclaimed water,
and thus polluting the sacred space, may “threaten the very core of
Hopi spiritual practice.” 140
These arguments are compelling: they show the true seriousness
of the government's actions on these sacred lands. They are
persuasive arguments that the treated sewage at issue in Navajo
Nation should not be used on land sacred to the Native Americans
and that the Forest Service reached the wrong conclusion in deciding
to permit it. However, even if the Forest Service was wrong, that
does not mean that the courts are the proper venue to prevent these
actions from occurring. As the Supreme Court in Lyng stated, such
decisions, when they do not cross the line of coercion, are more
suited to the political branches of the government. 141
There are problems with entrusting such matters entirely to the
political branches. The courts have often been relied on to protect
minorities from majoritarian politics. 142 Yet, the political process
often does protect minority religions. Although it required lobbying,
federal regulations now protect the religious use of peyote in spite
of rulings in federal court that such protection was not mandated by
the First Amendment. 143 In the past, the executive branch has also
taken steps to help ensure protection of Native American interests,
and it can and should continue to do so whenever reasonable. 144
While expecting Congress to intervene swiftly or on a regular basis
is likely to be problematic, Congress could be petitioned to
strengthen the provisions of laws that require consultation with and
consideration of Native American needs such as the American
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Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA). 145 Since the AIRFA was
insufficient to obtain results favorable to the Native American
religious followers in Lyng and did prevent the issues that arose in
Navajo Nation, it is clearly inadequate to provide protections that
would satisfy the current criticisms. But similar laws have already
helped reach accommodations between the government and Native
American groups on several issues, and it could readily be
strengthened to provide more favorable treatment for Native
American religious concerns. 146 The law as it stands is inadequate
to provide the needed protections to Native American religious
groups, but the political branches have taken some steps in that
direction and they should further improve the way they handle
religious sensibilities.
Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that courts should provide
greater review for the actions of federal agencies and their land use,
the RFRA is not the proper statute to bring such redress. The RFRA
was explicitly intended to restore the pre-Smith jurisprudence. But
Lyng was a pre-Smith case, 147 and so was Wilson. 148 In both of those
cases, the courts declined to protect the Native American interest
against the government's actions on federally owned land. If a
currently existing statute is to be interpreted more broadly to provide
better protection for sacred sites, then there are other candidates
such as the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA). 149
The court in Lyng read the AIRFA narrowly, but future courts could
be read it more broadly to provide greater protections for established
Native American groups without distorting the interpretation of the
RFRA. 150 Using a law like the AIRFA, which is specifically limited
to protecting established Native American religions, would also
avoid the concerns of subjecting every government action to
religious scrutiny by every possible religious interpretation. Using
the AIRFA more broadly would have a narrower impact than would
using the RFRA more broadly. Although the arguments that the
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forest service made the wrong decision are compelling, there are
better ways of redressing it than the courts. There are more
appropriate statutes, which are designed specifically to provide
protections to Native Americans, to do it than the RFRA if it must
be redressed by the courts.
The critics, including the dissent, used a number of hypothetical
examples to attempt to show that the meaning of substantial burden
should encompass the use of reclaimed water on sacred land. The
dissent, with later agreement from a number of commentators,
subtly accuses the majority of being ethnocentric and tries to use
these hypotheticals to show something that would be comparable in
the Judeo-Christian framework. 151 For instance, the dissent asserted
that the majority would likely find a substantial burden if there was
a law that required the use of treated wastewater for baptisms. The
courts would likely strike down such a law, but with an equal
protection argument since it would target Christians on its face.
However, a law or government action of general applicability that
came close to that in effect most likely would be acceptable under
the RFRA. For instance, several cities now add treated sewage
directly back to their general water source. 152 Clearly, this is not the
same as requiring the use of reclaimed wastewater for baptisms, but
it does mean that any member of the clergy wishing to avoid that
would have to take extra steps and added expense to avoid doing so
in those cities. Should a city decide to take the matter further and
reserve bottled water in the city only for use in hospitals, making it
yet more difficult to do baptisms without using treated wastewater,
courts would likely uphold it as an act of general applicability which
merely burdened religious feelings.
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The dissent also asserted that “a court would surely hold that the
government had imposed a ‘substantial burden’ on the exercise of
religion if it purchased by eminent domain every Catholic Church
in the country.” Such a sweeping action targeted at a single religious
institution would be struck down on equal protection. But a less
extreme version of that has previously survived judicial scrutiny.
The Pillar of Fire, a religious organization, sued to prevent the
condemnation of one of their church buildings under imminent
domain. 153 They claimed that the church had a “unique religious
significance”, although the court was skeptical of that claim. 154 They
made occasional use of this church for active religious worship
along with other church business and the building held historical
value to the Pillar of Fire since it served as their headquarters for a
time. 155 The condemnation was part of an urban renewal project that
contemplated the complete redevelopment of the church’s region,
and was done as a generally applicable action which did not
specifically target a religious activity. 156 Since this was a matter
before the state court and the decision was rendered in 1976, they
did not specifically consider the substantial burden test as it was later
developed. Nonetheless, the court found that “the contemplated
condemnation of the property would not interfere with the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious worship by the Pillar of Fire
Church.” 157 It was found Constitutional, and the reasoning would
have remained applicable under the substantial burden test had it
been developed at that time. The situation in Navajo Nation cannot
even be meaningfully distinguished by asserting that the Snowbowl
is a unique location. While the court in Pillar of Fire specifically
rejected the church’s claim that the location was “sui generis”, it
went on to say that even if it assumed that the property were sui
generis, that would not have changed the ruling. 158
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In addition to those hypotheticals, the dissent in Navajo Nation
brings up two prior cases that it asserts show that the situation in
Navajo Nation should fall within the meaning of substantial burden.
In Shakur, a Muslim prisoner was denied kosher meals and the
regular meals were forbidden by his religion. 159 He was offered
vegetarian meals, which were acceptable to his religion, but
allegedly caused health issues due to medical conditions. 160 The
court stated that this could constitute a substantial burden and
remanded for additional factual findings. 161 But in Shakur, the
government brought enormous pressure upon him to change his
behavior, distinguishing it from the matter in Navajo Nation. The
government essentially offered the inmate the choice of eating food
which violated his religion or forgoing the benefit of proper meals
provided by the prison. 162 The vegetarian option, if his assertions
were true, was no option because it created medical issues for him.
Indeed, the court in Shakur notes that it had previously denied a
similarly situated Muslim inmate’s request for kosher meals because
that inmate had no medical condition that would be exacerbated by
the vegetarian meal. 163 The inmate thus, while partially because of
his medical condition, was being punished for following his
religion, which is absent in the Navajo Nations case.
Mockaitis, the other case mentioned by the dissent, is similar in
that the inmates were being presented with a coercive choice. 164
There, a district attorney had recorded the confession of an inmate
to a priest. 165 The Ninth Circuit found that this constituted a
substantial burden on the religious practice of the Catholic priests. 166
However, in that case the Ninth Circuit did not attempt to precisely
define the term substantial burden nor did it perform the type of
analysis that would have shown what definition they were applying
to reach that conclusion. 167 Despite the dissent’s assertions that the
159
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Mockaitis decision conflicts with the majority opinion, this situation
most likely would be a substantial burden under the definition
provided by the majority. Once inmates and prisoners knew that the
prosecution could record confessions, a suspect would be placed in
the forbidden choice of abandoning a significant sacrament or else
suffering the punishment of being forced to deliver evidence to the
prosecution. That would be a powerful coercive force. In Navajo
Nation, the Native Americans face no such coercive choice. The
Native Americans may no longer find value in the rites performed
on the mountain after it has been tainted by the recycled water, but
they are not punished for performing the ceremony. The inmate in
Mockaitis is punished directly for performing his sacrament by
handing information to the prosecution.
While the use of the wastewater may be repugnant to the Native
Americans, none of the examples provided by the dissent and
embraced by academic critics demonstrates why it should be
considered a substantial burden under the RFRA. Courts would
likely not find the hypotheticals to be a substantial burden if reduced
to any form that would be a generally applicable law. While the
examples from prior cases they employ clearly were declared a
substantial burden, those cases are readily distinguished from the
situation in Navajo Nation and most likely would be found to be
substantial burdens. This of course does not imply that the Forest
Service made the right decision, but it does help show that the Ninth
Circuit did in its limited review.
V. CONCLUSION
The law has on multiple occasions failed to protect locations that
are sacred Native Americans. This has a direct and unfortunate
impact on their religious experiences and their perception of their
spirituality. There is a strong and compelling moral argument that
this situation should be changed to provide Native Americans with
greater protections and to ensure that their sacred locations are
treated with proper respect, counterbalanced only with truly vital
governmental interests.
While the interests of Native American religious groups should
be protected, the reasoning employed by the majority in Navajo
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Nation shows that the RFRA is not the proper tool with which to do
that. It is not the proper tool based upon statutory analysis since that
indicates the narrow reading that the majority does employ, and that
is consistent with other Supreme Court cases. The statute, on its
face, was meant to restore a specific body of case law, but that case
law had generally failed to provide proper protections for Native
American sacred sites even before it was overturned. The RFRA is
not the proper tool based on policy, for reading the phrase
“substantial burden” broadly enough to bring the Native American
land issues under the ambit of the RFRA would subject government
actions to enormous scrutiny from a wide array of actors. Rather,
the political branches should act and direct governmental agencies
to show yet more deference to Native American needs, and
particularly to their sacred sites in their administrative decision
making process.

